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1. An Overview 
This paper reveals what can be called an ‘ultra-low regime’ in China in 1368-1911, over half a 
millennium, known as the Ming-Qing Period of China’s Imperial history. Despite China’s grandeur 
façade, the empire’s public finance was minimalistic. During this period, in absolute terms, China’s 
per capita tax burden was halved, unique in East Asia to say the least (see Figure 1). It begs the 
question of whether state rent-seeking always has the tendency to become insatiable, as what 
Mancur Olson asserts.1 
 




Sources: Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 428; Deng, ‘True Population Statistics’, Appendix 2. 
 
1 Olson, ‘Dictatorship’, pp. 567-76. 
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What is puzzling though is that the decline took place when China’s farmland and population both 
grew (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Supply of Farmland, 1644 vs 1812 
  Total territory(km2) Farmland (km2)*   
Ming (1644 AD) 5,964,000 467,598  
Qing (1812 AD) 11,604,000 607,984  
Change %  195 130 
 
Sources: Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 346, 380; cf. Myers and Wang, ‘Economic Developments’, p. 571. 
Note: * Conversion of mu to km2 with the ratio of 1,500:1.  
 
One wonders how and why China’s tax burden should have been allowed to decline. Rationally, 
the state could have maintained the same low tax rate, not offending the tax-paying population, 
and still received more revenue pari passu with an enlarging economy, rather than reduced tax rate 
to make citizens happier. Odd. 
 
 
2. Making of an Ultra-low Tax Regime 
As far as one can tell, two factors can be attributed to China’s low tax burden. Firstly, there was a 
‘passive mode’ with which the government by default did not carry out or update any empire-wide 
survey of farmland upon which the main direct tax – the land tax – was levied. The well-
documented and frequently-cited scheme of ‘Fish-scale Land Tax Registration’ (yulin ce) covered 
merely less than half of the Qing territory, but the Qing taxation was still based on the Ming 
registration,2 although the cadastral information was hopelessly outdated. Moreover, during the 
early Ming Period, both farmland and population declined: In 1393, the Ming government laid 
taxes on a total of 850.7 million mu of farmland;3 by 1426, it was halved to 412.5 million mu; 
meanwhile China’s tax-paying population also decreased by 15 percent.4 It may not be in the 
government best interest to follow up such changes closely to hurt its budget. So, information 
outdating worked both ways. 
 
Secondly, there was an ‘active mode’ with which the state made a conscious decision not to 
increase taxes. The best example was the 1712 Imperial creed of ‘permanent freezing the total tax 
revenue’ (yongbu jiafu) by Emperor Kangxi (r. 1661-1722). The 1712 revenue ceiling was set at the 
 
2 Paddies look like fish scales in a bird-eye map, hence the name; see Zhang, Ming Dynasty, ch. ‘Shihuo Zhi’. 
3 15 mu ≈ 1 acre. 
4 Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 8. 
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level of 30 million silver taels per year (1,125 metric tons).5 This policy was relevant to Land-Poll 
Tax (diding yin), and was carefully observed over a century until 1850 by which time China’s total 
farmland and population increased significantly.  
 
There was some leeway whereby more tax could be levied after 1712 in the name of the ‘Silver 
Wear and Tear Surcharge’ (haoxian) which was 12 percent of the Land-Poll.6 This marginal increase 
made the Qing direct tax 33.7 million silver taels in total (1,263.8 tons). So, the 1712 capping was 
still valid. With the capped revenue, the tax-burden on farmland and on population declined by 14 
percent and 1522 percent, respectively (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Changes in China’s Farmland and Population, 1711 vs 1833  
  Farmland (km2)* Population (x 106)  
1711 462,023 24.6  
1833 527,683 399.0 
Change % 114 1622 
 
Source: Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 8. 
Note: * Conversion of mu to km2 with the ratio of 1,500:1. 
 
In per capita terms, the tax burden of 33.7 million silver taels was about 0.08 taels (3 grams) per 
head per year (as of the 1880s). According to Sidney Gamble, the average daily wage for unskilled 
labourers in Beijing during the 1850s was 0.05-0.08 silver taels in the sluggish season and 0.09-0.15 
silver taels in the busy season.7 Thus, the annual Land-Poll burden per head was about 1-2 days’ 
wage earned by an unskilled urban worker.  
 
In addition, to pay bureaucrats and soldiers stationed in North China as their salaries in kind, 
annually four million shi (about 290,000 metric tons) of ‘Stipend Rice’ (caomi, caoliang) was 
mandatorily collected from eight provinces (Shandong, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, 
Zhejiang and Jiangxi) along the Grand Cannel.8 This amount, which served also as a direct tax, 
accounted for 1.3 kg of rice per head in the provinces in question,9 or about 5 grams of grain 
(about 0.00001 silver tael) per capita a year for the whole empire. This burden is too light to be 
counted. Hence, the tax burden of 1-2 days’ wage for an unskilled worker stays. 
 
5 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 9261. 
6 See Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 419; Wang, Late Taxation, p. 70. 
7 For the wage data see Gamble, ‘Daily Wages’, p. 62. For the money exchange rate, see Yu, History of Prices, p. 860. 
8 He, ‘Canal Shipping’, p. 1087; also see Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 366-73; Chao, Man and Land, p. 209. Another figure 
is 5 million shi per year; see Zhou, Financial History, pp. 419-21, 426; Wang, Late Taxation, p. 70. One shi = 72.49 
kilograms, according to Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 545. 
9 For the population of the eight provinces, see Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 262-5. 
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However, there is a caveat: Stipend Rice was levied through tax-farming. The rice payment was 
conventionally commissioned to village leaders called the ‘gentry’. The deal was that as long as the 
legally required four million shi was delivered to the Beijing Depot, no question was asked. The 
village gentry, who acquired local knowledge, administrative skills and ability to communicate with 
government officials, fulfilled the tax-farming task.10 By definition the amount collected under tax-
farming was open-ended. In the end, at least an extra 10 million shi of rice (about 725,000 metric 
tons) was actually collected.11 The extra never reached Beijing. Rather, it was retained by the local 
gentry as income.12  
 
The gentry was the main beneficiary of the tax-farming.13 It was a game of double dipping. This is 
how it worked: On the one hand, inside the village, rice dues were disproportionately born by 
ordinary villagers;14 influential households tried their best to avoid their shares.15 On the other 
hand, the local gentry blackmailed officials for more service fees. Their tricks included blocking 
rice shipments and making false accusations against officials.16 Outnumbered, government officials 
became powerless. Other than calling the local gentry ‘cunning’, ‘evil’, ‘crafty’, and ‘wicked’,17 very 
little could be done.18 Make no mistake here: The local gentry that handled the Stipend Rice 
collection was not a branch of the Imperial government. 
 
The personal gain for the gentry was mouth-watering: According to a report to the throne filed in 
the 1830s, village gents profited on average 100 silver taels a year each.19 This sum was an equivalent 
to the annual pay of a government minister in Beijing. In some extreme cases, local gents who did 
not handle a single grain received several thousand silver taels.20  
 
Now, even if one counts the extra 10 million shi of rice towards government taxation, which would 
make the total rice extraction a total of 14 million shi, the total burden was about 25 grams of grain 
(worth about 0.00005 silver taels) per head per year. Thanks to the low value of the staple food 
rice, the extra rent sought by the local gentry increased the direct tax burden, but marginally.  
 
10 Chang, Income, ch. 2. 
11 He and Wei, Qing Administration, p. 1089. 
12 Li and Jiang, Stipend Rice, p. 457. 
13 For the number of ships, see Zai, Stipend Rice, vol. 17, pp. 28-30; see also Xu, Antidotes, Book 4, vol. 19, p. 13. 
14 Cited in Zhou, State Finance, p. 138; see also Kuhn, Chinese State, pp. 80-100. 
15 Le, Emperor Xuanzong, vol. 435, pp. 9-10. 
16 Cited in Zhou, State Finance, pp. 134-5. 
17 Tao, Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 81; Le, Emperor Xuanzong, vol. 435, pp. 9-10. 
18 Esherick and Rankin, Local Elites. 
19 Tao, Collected Works, vol. 1, p. 68. Note: Jiangnan Province included present-day Anhui and Jiangsu. 
20 Xu, Antidotes, Book 4, vol. 19, p. 8. 
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Meanwhile, geographically, the burden direct taxes in terms of both the Land-Poll and Stipend 
Rice was not evenly distributed (Figure 2), which implied local bargaining power. Wealthy inland 
provinces along the Yangzi River – Sichuan, Hunan and Hubei – paid disproportionally less taxes 
than their counterparts elsewhere. However, if the absolute tax burden was light, tax inequality did 
not matter much. 
 
















































































































Source: Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 380-417. 
Note: The bar represents the provincial average tax burden. 
 
What may surprise the observer also is a high degree of cash payment from North China (Zhili, 
Sshanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, and Anhui) ahead of coastal Zhejiang and Fujian. This supports the 
Skinnerian view that there was no ‘back water’ for the market economy across the empire.21 
 
Another type was the indirect tax, voluntary on the part of consumer and hence less tyrannical and 
less burdensome. Until 1850, Salt Tax claimed a lion’s share of all indirect taxes.22 Given the low 
income and low price elasticities of salt, consumers had a great willingness to pay the tax. The 
available data indicate that in the 1840s, a total of 10 million taels (375 tons) were collected annually 
 
21 Skinner, ‘Marketing and Social Structure’. 
22 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9269-83. 
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from salt levies (yanke).23 Meanwhile, most marketed goods traded in local markets were tax-free.24 
Salt Tax was thus a rare exception.  
 
As China had a population of about 400 million (1833), 25  the Qing annual indirect taxes 
represented by Salt Tax were merely 0.025 taels per head per year. Again, if one uses the 
aforementioned Beijing wage benchmark, the annual burden was 0.2-0.5 days’ pay. 
 
Finally, there was the much publicised ‘One-Percent Transit Surcharge’ (likin, lijin) which began 
very late as an ad hoc and one-off source of government revenue. The trigger for it to be introduced 
was China’s empire-wide social unrest in the 1850s: The Taipings, Nians, Muslins and Miaos. The 
only regions free from the rioters were Tibet, Mongolia and Manchuria, regions that were not ruled 
directly by Beijing.26 This time the Qing state faced the real possibility to be toppled. In 1853, out 
of desperation, officials fighting the Taipings imposed this new tax to cover contingency military 
expenses in the Yangzhou region (Jiangsu) only as a temporary measure.27 The tax rate was set at 
one percent of goods’ value in transit. Simple, easy, and light, this new tax bore the hall mark of 
the Imperial tradition, at least when it started.  
 
In 1855, all governors were permitted to impose Transit Surcharge to pay for the war. 28 
Consequently, ‘Transit Surcharge check points’ (lika) mushroomed across the empire, which was 
confirmed by Augustus Frederick Lindley, the notorious London-born sympathiser of the 
Taipings, as ‘within 30 miles there are no less than 15 lijin checkpoints.’29 As far as one can tell, by 
1864, there were 123 such check points in five provinces – Anhui, Jiangsu, Hubei, Hunan and 
Jiangxi.30 By 1862, all provinces apart from remote Yunnan, Heilongjiang and offshore Taiwan 
had been subject to this levy.31 
 
Revenue-wise, it has been estimated that between 1853 and 1864, the total Transit Surcharge 
revenue was in the region of 100 million silver taels,32 averaging 9 million per year, or 0.02 taels per 
 
23 Zhou, State Finance, pp. 419-26. 
24 Skinner, ‘Marketing and Social Structure’; Skinner, City, p. 24. For trade routes, see Fairbank and Liu, History of China, 
vol. 11, pt 2, p. 42. 
25 Deng, ‘True Population Statistics’, Appendix 2.  
26 Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, ch. 4. 
27 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 12, p. 10178; see also Beal, Likin. 
28 Luo, Transit Surcharge, vol. 1, pp. 20, 308. 
29 Lindley, Ti-Ping, vol. 1, pp. 43-4; vol. 2, p. 296. 
30 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 9281. 
31 Zhou, State Finance, p. 168. 
32 Luo, Transit Surcharge, vol. 1, p. 38. 
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head per year. Once again, with the aforementioned Beijing wage benchmark, the annual burden 
of Transit Surcharge counted for 0.2-0.5 days’ pay. 
 
We now have a fairly clear idea about China’s aggregate tax burden per head: half-week’s wage for 
an unskilled worker (Table 3).33 It justifies the assessment that the Qing state controlled 1-5 percent 
of China’s total GDP.34 
 
Table 3. Tax Burden per Capita per Year, circa 1860 
Type  High season days’ pay Low season days’ pay 
Land-Poll 1.0 2.0  
Salt Tax  0.2 0.5 
Transit Surcharge 0.2 0.5 
Total 1.4 3.0 
 
Source: The benchmark: Gamble, ‘Daily Wages’, p. 62. 
 
 
3. General Determinants for China’s Ultra-low Tax Regime 
It is vital to know that China’s ultra-low tax regime did not begin with the Ming-Qing state. Rather, 
it was inherited by the latter. Then, one wonders how China’s ultra-low tax regime was made 
possible in the long run in an allegedly highly centralised political system prone to power abuse 
and rent-seeking, à la the Eurocentric mentality of, say, Friedrich Hayek and Mancur Olson.35  
 
Prime facie, there were hitherto two overarching and long-lasting traditions (1) Confucian political 
ideology known as ren or ‘benevolent rule’ interlocked with (2) China’s state-peasant alliance. The 
former began very early, taking shape circa 530 BC to 290 BC;36 the latter, rival to Confucianism, 
came about circa 200-233 BC.37 What fused these two opposite traditions together was a 15-year-
long war from 236 to 221 BC for unification to end all wars on East Asia Mainland under the 
leadership of Emperor Qin Shihuang (r. 221-210 BC). During the war, the unifier, the Qin 
Kingdom (770-221 BC), was short of money to pay for its soldiers and began to pay its military 
personal farmland with private property rights. Such an accidental institutional arrangement turned 
 
33 One way to measure this tax burden out of 52 weeks a year: One percent. 
34 Feuerwerker, ‘State and the Economy’, p. 322. 
35 Hayek, Serfdom; Olson, ‘Dictatorship’. 
36 Two important figures responsible for the establishment of Confucian ideology were Confucius (551-479 BC) and 
Mencius (372-289 BC). But, it was not until 134 BC when Dong Zhongshu (192-104 BC) persuaded Emperor Wudi 
(r. 141-87 BC) of the Han Dynasty was Confucianism adopted as the state philosophy. The time lag from an ideology 
to a state philosophy was over three centuries. 
37 Legalism was the creation of the political strategist Han Fei (280-233 BC). 
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out to be the foundation of China’s timeless ‘state-peasant alliance’ which was the core of the 
political economy of the empire ever since.38 Call it an ‘unintended consequence’ if you will.  
 
However, at the beginning, the alliance was unstable. The tyranny of rent-seeking by a centralised 
state through heavy taxation including corvée prevailed. It was documented that the new 
government corvée burden and tax rate was 20 and 30 times higher than before, respectively.39 A 
mass tax-rebellion by the land-holding soldier-cum-peasantry followed, which ended the Qin rule 
in a matter of months.  
 
This historic rebellion served as a catalysis for a change in the leading ideology from Legalism to 
Confucianism. In the following Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD), the political elite’s determination 
to outlaw excessive, rapacious rent-seeking led to a wholesale adoption of the Confucian ethic and 
code of conduct whose centrality was the concept of ‘benevolence’ or ‘benevolent rule’ (ren). 
Benevolence necessitates low taxation. But how low was low? The new Han standard rate for 
annual farming output was set at ‘1 of 30’ (sanshi er shui yi), or 3 percent.40 This new taxation 
standard stabilised the empire morally and politically; and the Han Dynasty lasted for four 
centuries compared with mere 14 years of its predecessor Qin. This longevity justified the adoption 
of Confucian taxation self-discipline as a ‘system stabiliser’, a sine qua non and chose jugée for the 
existing state-peasant alliance. This process took eight decades (221 BC to 134 BC) to complete. 
Once the state-peasant alliance and Confucian ethic and code of conduct joined up and worked 
symbiotically, it created path dependence.  
 
So, under the normal circumstances, Confucian ethic and code of conduct acted as the ‘soft 
sanction’ against deviation from ultra-low taxation by measuring government legitimacy, or the 
lack of it. If Confucian sanction failed (and did), there was the ‘hard sanction’ of outright political 
violence to end an illegitimate dynasty and re-set the clock. Over the two-millennium long Imperial 
rule in China there were over 2000 mass rebellions.41 Rebellions effectively deterred deviation from 
the ultra-low tax norm. Thus, peasant rebellions, like a sword of Damocles, formed the ultimate 




38 Deng, Chinese Economy, pp. 139-40. 
39 Ban, Han Dynasty), vol. 1, p. 477. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, ch. 4. 
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Right from the beginning of the empire, the degree of rent-seeking and the duration of a dynasty’s 
shelf life were negatively correlated. The choice that a ruler could make was between ‘rent-seeking 
and ruling China short’ and ‘rent-restricting and ruling China long’. Unless one understands this 
correlation, China’s taboo against heavy taxation remains a myth. It is now easy to understand also 
how and why the Eurocentric accusation against the Imperial state of China of being incompetence 
can be both naïve and unjustified. 
 
Fast forward in history, the violent ending of the barbaric Yuan in 1368 was good riddance for the 
Chinese. The following Ming was in a mood of cultural and socio-economic renaissance from the 
disastrous military conquest of the Mongols (1279-1368) who introduced a whole spectrum of 
alien systems, ranging from the Mongolian and Persian languages, apartheid, slavery, serfdom, 
trade monopoly, to hyper-taxation.42 The first thing the Mongol conquest carried out was the 
abolition of China’s law, bureaucracy, Confucian ideology, social stratification, free land-holding 
peasantry, and free market, all in one go. And, heavy losses in indigenous Han Chinese population 
followed,43 which never fully recovered under the entire Mongol rule over nine decades.44 So, 
before being toppled by a bloody rebellion in 1368, the Mongols presented a constant threat to 
the very survival of the Chinese civilisation. 
 
Logically, the Ming rule of the indigenous Han Chinese was obliged to reverse the Mongol system 
to rescue the Chinese civilisation from a total ruin. The essence of the renaissance was to rebuild 
the state-peasant alliance plus the Confucian ethic and code of conduct. On the whole, the 
renaissance was a great success which was highlighted by the propagandic seven voyages to the 
Indian Ocean by the Ming Armada during 1405-1433 AD, the greatest maritime show in the world 






42 Ibid., ch. 5. 
43 Prior to the Mongols conquests, China’s population was about 100 million. According to the official information, 
in 1261AD, China’s population was 7 million persons (1.1 million households to be exact). The decline was a 
whopping 93 percent. See Song, Yuan History, vol. 9, p. 7247. The reason was an undeniable genocide policy carried 
out by Kublai Khan, ‘the Butcher of China’ (r. 1260-94 AD). Kublai’s notorious declaration was documented as: ‘As 
the Han Chinese are useless to us, let us kill them all for land to feed livestock.’ Ibid., vol. 9, p. 7635. 
44 By the time when the Mongols were toppled, China’s total population was still 22 percent lower than circa 1200 AD; 
see Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 8. 
45 Deng, Maritime Sector. 
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4. Specific Determinants for Ultra-low Tax Regime under the Qing 
From circa 1400 to 1700, the global climate cooled down, known as the Little Ice Age. The average 
temperature dropped by at least 0.5° C globally.46 This force majeure caused severe droughts during 
the 1620s-30s in Northern China and crop failures became common.47 As the Ming Treasury 
possessed little savings, government budget was helplessly cut, as a good Confucian state had to 
do. As a result, government employees were affected. Like many, Li Zicheng (1606-45), an 
Imperial Post employee, lost his job. He joined the army on the frontier but his finance did not 
improve, as the soldiers did not get paid, either. He managed to plot a mutiny and hence a rebellion 
began in 1627.48 This rebellion was clearly not because of heavy taxation. Rather, crop failures 
dramatically lowed the threshold for social unrest, and the participants – overwhelmingly vagrants 
– had nothing to lose. 
 
From 1627 to 1644, the rebels, not particularly numerous by the Chinese standard, gradually 
controlled the Yellow River Valley. In 1644, they attacked the capital city Beijing, captured the 
Imperial Palace, and declared a new dynasty ‘Dashun’ (literally ‘Big Smooth’). The last Ming 
Emperor (r. 1628-44) committed suicide. Clearly, the rebels were better funded and better 
organised than the Ming army.  
 
But the new rebels’ regime lasted for just 42 days. What the rebels did not take into account was 
the diplomatic skills of the Ming elite. After the fall of Beijing, one of the military leaders of the 
Ming Army, Wu Sangui (1612-1678), opened the gate of the Shanhaiguan Pass along the northeast 
corner of the Great Wall defence line and invited 60,000 elite cavalrymen of the Manchus as 
mercenaries in a bid to expel the rebels. The fate of the mob rebels was soon doomed. 
 
But what happened next surprised the Ming host: instead of restoring the Ming emperorship, the 
Manchu mercenaries took over Beijing and established their own fait accompli dynasty, the Qing 
(1644-1911). This caused resentment and animosity on the Chinese part. All that the Manchu 
empire-thieves could do was to redeem their ‘sin’ of breaching the 1644 contract with the Mings. 
The most significant measures for the Manchu coûte que coûte redemption included (1) Sinicisation 
and Confucianisation,49 (2) power-sharing with the indigenous Han Chinese, and (3) full adoption 
of Confucian benevolent rule.  
 
46 Various sources: e.g. Anon, ‘Global Temperature’; Anon, ‘Temperature Reconstruction’; Anon, ‘Warming Period’. 
47 Zhang, Ming Dynasty, vo. 10, p. 7837. 
48 Ibid., vo. 10, pp. 8643-44. 
49 Rawski, ‘Reenvisioning the Qing’; Ho, ‘Sinicization’; also, Crossley, Translucent Mirror; Elliott, Manchu Way. 
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First of all, it was the choice of the name for the new dynasty. ‘Qing’ means ‘keeping China cleaner 
than before’ or ‘being whiter than white’. This makes a good sense if one understands the 
horrendous damages inflicted by the Mongol anti-Chinese rule in 1279-1368, a nightmare that was 
still alive in the collective memory of the indigenous Han Chinese. So, the word ‘Qing’ served as 
an insurance to the Chinese: We Manchus were different.50  
 
Secondly, all the Chinese social norms and customs were carefully observed. The Ming moto for 
the empire remained unchanged: ‘A united empire of the Han and non-Han peoples alike’ (tianxia 
yitong, huayi yijia).51 The last Ming Emperor, the victim of the Ming rebellion, was given a state 
funeral organised by the Qing authorities.52 Ming Imperial tombs were also carefully protected.53 
The Chinese language was granted the status of the first official language, a practice which 
eventually led to outsiders’ mistaking the language used in the Qing Court for the ‘Manchu 
language’ (hence the English term ‘Mandarin’). The Manchu language was so ignored that it was 
gradually lost. From a young age, all Qing Imperial family members were strictly educated by top 
Chinese scholars to indoctrinate their ‘Chinese-ness’ artificially. 
 
Thirdly, all key Ming institutions stayed intact. As Fairbank correctly points out, ‘the Manchu by 
the time they came to power in China had already mastered the Confucian art of government and 
reconciled their own political institutions with it’.54 Confucianism remained as the state philosophy. 
There was a seamless continuation of bi-annual Imperial Examinations for Recruiting Bureaucrats 
(keju): The last Ming examination took place in 1643, while the first Qing examination began in 
1646 without any change in rubric.55 In total, the Qing state ran 122 examinations for civil servants 
and 102 examinations for military officers. The Ming could not have done any better. In addition, 
in the Qing examinations, top places (zhuangyuan) were awarded overwhelmingly to the ethnic Han 
(Table 4). In contrast, the Yuan Mongols suspended Imperial Examinations for 80 years. When 
the Imperial Examinations were reluctantly resumed in the last decade at the end of the Mongol 
anomy, the best qualified in society – the erudite Han Chinese – were only granted a quarter of all 
 
50 It is worth noting that in 1234 AD the Mongols conquered the Jin Kingdom of North China (1115-1234 AD), 
slaughtered and enslaved the Jurchens. The Jurchens were, no less, the ancestors of the Manchus. Among the Han, 
Jurchens/Manchu and Mongols, the Mongols were the least civilised and were thus persona non grata. 
51 Dong, Emperor Taizu, vols 30, 53, 264. 
52 See Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 12, p. 9826.  
53 Wei Zaitian, Xu Xuechu and Li Yawei (eds), Kangxi Zhiguo Shengxun (Emperor Kangxi’s Instructions on State Management) 
(Beijing: Expatriates’ Press, 1995), p. 251. 
54 Fairbank, United States and China, p. 77. 
55 Song, Champions, pp. 52, 451-5. 
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candidates in order to keep the monopoly of the state power by the Mongols among whom many 
were illiterate.56 
 
Table 4. Distribution of Examination Champions during the Qing 
  Manchu, % in total Han, % in total  
 Civil examinations 2.7 97.3 
 Military examinations 2.8 97.2 
 
Source: Song, Champions, pp. 52-104, 451-5. 
 
In addition, laws were passed to allow Han Chinese to become officials with little discrimination. 
The Qing regulations had a total of 278 pages on ‘How to Select Han Chinese as Officials’ (xuan 
hanguan) compared to only 100 pages on ‘How to Select Manchus as Officials’ (xuan manguan).57 As 
a result, power-sharing between the Manchu and Han Chinese was achieved (Table 5). This power 
sharing, out of savoir-faire maybe, contrasts sharply with the Yuan Mongol dystopia under which 
the indigenous Chinese were systematically excluded from office while Europeans and Middle-
Easterners (semu ren) were purposely brought in to work for the Mongol regime as mercenary 
bureaucrats.58  
 
Table 5. Ethnic Distribution of Officials and Officers (% in Total), 1644-1911 
  Manchu Han Chinese Mongols Total 
I. Top ranks (1st - 3rd Grades)  
 Civil* 52.5 45.9 1.6 100 
 Military† 38.5 38.5 23.0 100 
II. Middle ranks (4th - 6th Grades) 
 Civil* 63.1 32.7 4.2 100 
 Military† 57.7 24.4 17.9 100 
III. Lower ranks (7th - 9th Grades)  
 Civil* 77.6 16.4 6.0 100  
 Military† 40.9 31.8 27.3 100 
Total (I+II+III) 59.4 25.5 15.1 100 
 
Sources: Dai, Comprehensive Indices, pp. 1206-1390; Zhang, State Apparatus, pp. 6, 38-43, 57, 79, 105-6, 126; Song, 
Champions, pp. 477-87. 
Notes: * Positions in the central administration only. † Officers of the elite Eight Banners. 
 
Finally, to win the heart and mind of the indigenous Han Chinese, the Qing state maintained the 
Confucian doctrine of benevolence to its full. The Qing state recognised people’s entitlements and 
 
56 Deng, Development versus Stagnation, p. 24. 
57Anon., Regulations, pp. 113-213, 214-492. 
58 Marco Polo was thus lucky for being a non-Chinese; and he knew little about the brutality of his nomadic boss. 
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knew how to increase them.59 Although before 1700 the Qing tax burden was already on par with 
the Ming, an extra mile was taken in 1712 to freeze the total revenue from direct taxes for good.60 
Not a temporary expediency, this was a long-term commitment ex ante, also a huge gamble, 
unilaterally taken by the head of the state, suggesting that the Manchus were fully aware that they 
only lived on borrowed time.  
 
As China’s population and farmland both on the rise, declines in the tax burden were logical.61 In 
the end, the Qing direct-tax burden per head and per unit of farmland fell 79 percent and 50 
percent, respectively.62 As a result, the Qing taxation became so light that ‘people barely noticed 
the tax system, almost as if they suffered no tax burden at all.’63  
 
To sum up, The Ming-Qing ultra-low tax regime did not come about randomly but was dictated 
by (1) a super-long tradition marked by the state-peasant alliance and its matching Confucian ethic 
and code in general, and (2) the Manchu desire to redeem their political sin through winning the 
heart and mind of the indigenous Han Chinese in particular. So, the Manchus were superiorly 
shrewder than their foolhardy Mongol counterpart. Nothing was left for chances, verbun sat sapienti. 
Therefore, there was no mass tax rebellion in the rural sector during the Qing for 200 years (1644-
1844). Quid pro quo: Mission accomplished. 
 
 
5.  ‘First Order’ Impact of China’s Ultra-low Tax Regime 
An obvious issue is the impact of ultra-low taxation on the state size and function. Firstly, behind 
its façade of extravagance, the Ming-Qing state was tiny for a vast land-based empire of 11 million 
km2 (as of 1800).64 The total number of bureaucrats on the government payroll was less than 
27,000, and the number remained stagnant. Between 1700 and 1850, officials increased by less 
than 10 percent (from 24,150 to 26,355) with an annual growth of 0.06 percent.65 In contrast, the 
Qing population increased 1.5 percent annually, 25 times that of the officials’.66 As bureaucrats 
 
59 For the concept, see Sen, Poverty and Famines. 
60 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 9261. 
61 Deng, ‘True Population Statistics’, Appendix 2. 
62 Liu and Fei, ‘Land Tax Burden’, pp. 373, 375-6. 
63 Mann, Local Merchants, p. 16. 
64 Yang, Bureaucracy, pp. 420-1; Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9071-9131.  
65 Yang, Bureaucracy, pp. 420-1. According to Chung-li Chang’s, Qing officials were between 12,000 and 22,830; see 
Chang, Income, pp. 42, 197, 329-30. 
66 For the Chinese population, see Deng, ‘True Population Statistics’, Appendix 2. 
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spread thinner and thinner across China, only 2,546 key officials were left in Beijing in charge of 
the central government (Table 6).67  
 
Table 6. Officials Employed in Beijing 
  Number of officials 
Cabinet (neige) 288 
Six ministries (liubu) 1,964 
Lesser departments 582 
Total   2,546 
 
Sources: Yang, Bureaucracy, pp. 420-1; and Zhang, State Apparatus, pp. 6, 39, 43, 57, 79, 106, 127.  
 
Against the backdrop of an enlarged population of 398.9 million (as of 1833),68 the following ratios 
reveal the ‘low-budget plight’ of the Qing state: 
 Population to all officials 15,136:1 
 Population to magistrates  214,710:169 
  
In addition, 2,650 military officers were responsible for a standing army of 780,000 troops for 
national defence,70 hence the ratio: 
 Soldiers to officers 294:1 
 
The ultimate raison d'être of a small bureaucracy was the limited government budget. It is known 
that the highest annual basic pay for Qing officials was 180 taels, and the lowest 45 taels.71 Provincial 
officials were also eligible for performance bonuses (known as yanglian yin, or ‘Bonus for Honesty 
and Uprightness’), 20 to 110 times of the basic pay, depending on rank, responsibility and financial 
affordability.72 If the annual average salary of officials was set at the level of 500 taels per head, the 
total wage bill would be in the region of 13 million taels for the 26,000 so or officials and officers.  
 
 
67 The Qing central government ran 24 hours a day to keep the empire going; see Wanyan, Government Offices, pp. 172-
81. 
68 Deng, ‘True Population Statistics’, Appendix 2. 
69 Based on the facts that 90 percent of the Qing population (hence 359 million in 1833) was rural, living in 1,672 
counties. 
70 Counting 120,000 Eight Banners (baqi) and 660,000 Green Standards (lüying, literarily ‘Green Corps’); see Zhao, 
Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9305, 9307.  
71 He and Wei, Qing Administration, p. 868. 
72 A country magistrate got 600-1,000 taels on top of his meagre 45 taels basic salary while a province governor-general 
got 15,000-20,000 taels bonus on top of his 180 taels basic salary; see Cheng and Ying, Regulations of Ministry of Revenue, 
vol. 73, ‘Honesty and Uprightness Bonus’; see also Zuo, Honesty and Uprightness Bonus; Zelin, Magistrate’s Tael. 
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The lion’s share of the state spending was the military: an ordinary Banner soldier (baqi) received 
a living allowance of 36 silver taels plus 5 shi stipend rice (362.5 kg) each year.73 In the 1850s, the 
Qing standing army maintained 780,000 troops.74 So, the Qing military would cost another 28 
million taels, excluding the rice.  
 
These two items – official salaries and soldier allowances – would balance the book of the Imperial 
Treasury with little surplus (Table 7). In this context, the taxation lid imposed in 1712 dictated the 
size of the Qing apparatus. 
 
Table 7. Annual Monetary Revenues and Expenditures, prior to 1850, in Million Taels 
  Revenue  Expenditure Balance 
Land-Poll ±33 
Slat  ±10 
Bureaucrats’ wages  ±13 
Soldiers’ allowances   ±28 
Total  ±43 ±41 ±2 
 
Source: Text above. 
 
This low-tax equilibrium was only ended by an empire-wide two-decade-long social unrest in the 
1850s–70s (Figure 3). The fundamental reason for the unrest to break out was the aforementioned 
low budget plight which led to low government presence in society rather than imaginative idée fixe 
of heavy suppression and heavy taxation imposed on 400 million people across 11 million km2. 












73 Zhao et al., Military History, vol. 3, p. 459. 
74 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9305, 9307.  
75 Deng, Premodern Chinese Economy, ch. 4. 
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Figure 3. Simultaneous and Ubiquitous Social Unrests, the 1850s–70s 
 
 
Sources: Yi and Zhu, Miao Bandits, vols 1–40; Yi and Zhu, Muslin Bandits in Shaanxi, vols 1–320; Yi and Zhu, Muslin 
Bandits in Yunnan, vols 1–50; Yi and Zhu, Taiping Bandits, vols 1–420. Also Michael, Taiping Rebellion, vol. 1, p. 216; 
Fairbank and Liu, History of China, vol. 11, pt 2, p. 216; Spence, Modern China, p. 187; Li et al., Peasant Rebellions; Atwill, 
Chinese Sultanate. 
Notes: 1 = Taiping-affected provinces (excluding their failed manoeuvres and attacks on Zhili, Hebei, Henan, 
Shandong, Shanxi and Anhui); 2 = Nian-affected provinces; 3 = Muslim unrests affected provinces; 4 = Miao unrest 
affected province; 5 = Nians and Muslims overlapping; 6 = Taipings and Nians overlapping; 7 = non-Qing territory; 
8 = Spots where unrests broke out; anticlockwise: northern Anhui (Nians), southern Shaanxi (Muslims), western 




In the wake of the aforementioned empire-wide social unrest in the 1850s throughout the 1870s, 
Transit Surcharge, some 9 million taels per year, was earmarked to build a new military equipped 
with expensive firearms of the European style. It was documented in the 1880s when the dust 
finally set, provincial armed forces mushroomed with 360,000 troops in total, costing minimal 20 
million taels per year, ceteris paribus:76  
 
 Province Troops 
 Manchuria 32,407 
 Zhili 63,400 
 Shandong 13,950 
 Sshanxi 4,900 
 Henan 9,190 
 Shaanxi 14,450 
 Gansu 12,500 
 Xinjiang 30,277 
 Anhui 11,290 
 Jiangsu 29,960 
 Zhejiang 21,300 
 Hubei 13,783 
 Hunan 12,970 
 Jiangxi 9,360 
 Sichuan 15,698 
 Yunnan 15,033 
 Guizhou 9,486 
 Fujian 10,540 
 Guangdong 11,800 
 Guangxi 16,940  
 
In addition, by 1900, there had been also provincial water-borne forces (shuishi). They had 2,530 
large ships and 44,900 marines.77 They all cost money. 
 
Bear in mind also, China’s new military required modern capital-intensive arsenals to support, 








76 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 9311. 
77 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9318-24; Zhang and Gao, Naval History, p. 418. 
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Table 8. Provincial Arsenals and Annual Outputs 
Name Location Start time Output 
Suzhou* Suzhou 1865 Bullets (100,000 rounds) 
Jiangnan* Shanghai 1867 Rifles (65,000), bullets (8.6 million), 
    cannons (742), shells (1.6 million), 
    gunpowder (6.7 million pounds), and 
    ships (15) 
Tianjin* Tianjin 1870 Rifles (52), bullets (16.1 million), 
    shells (40,000), and 
    gunpowder (6.1 million pounds) 
Guangzhou Guangzhou 1874 Bullets (240,000) 
Sichuan Chengdu 1877 Rifles (18,681), bullets (3.3 million), 
    and shells (5,400) 
Hanyang* Hubei 1890 Rifles (18,250), bullets (15.6 million), 
    cannons (96), shells (84,000), 
    and gunpowder (7,200 pounds) 
Jinling* Nanjing 1899 Rifles (18), bullets (131,500), 
    cannons (64), and shells (65,800) 
 
Sources: Xu, Westernisation Movement, pp. 25, 28, 32, 34, 35, 36; Li, Late Qing, p. 423. Also, Wright, Chinese Conservatism, 
p. 293. 
 
Obviously, the annual 9 million-tael Transit Surcharge revenue was not enough. But, the Qing state 
already reached its moral and physical limits for both direct and indirect taxes. Then, foreign debts 
became for the first time in China’s history as a welcoming option to top up the meagre state 
finance. Importantly, foreign borrowing was not on the Confucian moral agenda and was thus not 
politically incorrect. Facing no opposition in society, both Beijing and provinces borrowed heavily 
from the international capital market (Table 9).  
 
Table 9. Foreign Debts, Beijing vs Provinces (in 106 Taels), 1853-1911 
  Britain France US Germany Japan Russia Other Total 
Beijing  21.1 21.4 70.6 – 7.9 – – 121.0 
Provinces 36.4 – 25.1 7.7 16.0 9.3 11.9 106.4 
Total 57.5 21.4 95.7 7.7 23.9 9.3 11.9 227.4 
 
Source: Li, Late Qing, pp. 133, 184, 217, 218, 219, 223, 225, 227, 230, 238, 244, 252, 255, 265, 278, 278, 326, 340, 340, 
360, 376, 393, 452, 464, 474, 482, 484, 488, 488, 489, 513, 528, 537, 548, 566, 627, 630, 640, 651, 730, 807, 823, 833, 
845, 867, 881, 902, 916, 943, 964, 966, 980, 1003, 1023, 1053, 1055, 1056, 1065, 1073, 1094, 1099, 1109, 1119, 1130, 
1134, 1138, 1139, 1140, 1141, 1144, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1157, 1158, 1164, 1165, 1166, 1169, 1170, 1173, 1174, and 1175. 
Note: Excluding foreign borrowings for China’s railway projects because the ambiguity in the ownership.  
 
Secondly, the function of the Imperial state was extremely limited. On the county level, China 
genuinely ran a ‘night-watchman state’ which Adam Smith could only dream of. Regarding 
judiciary, at the grassroots level, a Qing county court typically opened for business for just two 
open days per month (gaofang ri) for a total of six months a year. In its upmost capacity, a county 
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magistrate received maximum 200 cases on each open day, or 2,400 cases each year.78 Given the 
aforementioned population-to-magistrates ratio of 214,710:1, 2,400 cases per year were likely to 
be just the tip of the iceberg. If all legal disputes had been handled by the state, the government 
would be crashed by the workload. 79  The solution was found in villages. In majority cases, 
customary rules (suli, literally ‘customary precedents’) and non-official channels were used to reach 
a settlement.80 Disputes were submitted to officials only after all non-official means and channels 
were exhausted.81 Clearly, the state judiciary became optional if not redundant. 
 
In terms of social order, there was no Imperial police force on the ground at all. Each village ran 
its own voluntary ‘Neighbourhood Watch Units’ (lijia, baojia). Entirely self-financed and self-
regulated, these neighbourhood watch units were not a branch of Imperial government.  
 
Neighbourhood watch units devoted one month in autumn to collecting government taxes, e.g. 
Land-Poll and Stipend Rice for the Imperial state,82 as the Ming-Qing authorities did not have the 
required manpower to do so. On top of tax collection, which occupied 8 percent of the time a 
year, the key task of neighbourhood watch units was to organise communal vigilance against 
internal crimes and external attacks in the form of ‘village guards’ called xiangbing (literally ‘village 
soldiers’) and tuanlian (literally ‘village trainbands for self-defence’).83 This police force did not cost 
the Imperial state a penny. By Qing law, it was forbidden to hire village guards for any official 
deployments.84 So, the tentacles of the Ming-Qing state stopped at the village gate.85 Village gents, 
those who possessed Imperial Exanimation degrees to gain their social footing, played a key role 
in running village autonomy. 
 
From the viewpoint of law and order (judiciary and police), villages (about 900,000 in total) in 
China were highly autonomous which was a perfect match with the minimal state. Some 
commonly circulated hypotheses, such as (pace tua) Marx’s ‘Asiatic Mode of Production’ and 
Wittfogel’s ‘Oriental Despotism’, do not hold much water for Ming-Qing China at all.86 
 
78 Dang, Shysters’ Culture, pp. 64-6.  
79 Bodde and Morris, Law. 
80 Jerome, ‘Uncivil Dialogue’; Cohen et al., Legal Tradition; Liang, Customary Law; see also Huang, Civil Justice; Huang, 
‘Civil Adjudication’. 
81 This was often mutually agreed between the villagers and the country magistrate; see Zelin, ‘Rights of Tenants’, pp. 
521-2. 
82 Jiang and Wang, Qing Records, Entry ‘Kangxi Wushiyi Nian Eryue’ (The 2nd Month and the 51st Year under the 
Kangxi Reign). 
83 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, pp. 9314-5; also Kuhn, Rebellion. 
84 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 11, p. 9314. 
85 Scalapina and Yu, Modern China, p. 8; see also Ch’ü, Local Government. 
86 Pryor, ‘The Asian Mode of Production;’ Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism. 
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As a result, citizens enjoyed freedom which was rather unusual in a premodern society. Such 
freedom was viewed as excessive, and even harmful, by the Republican leader, the American-
educated Sun Yat-sen, who famously said that: 
In China, everyone has maximised his own freedom; consequently, society has become a sheet of loose sands.87  
And, 
If a sheet of loose sand is the feature of the Chinese, our freedom has been too much for too long.88 
  
Sun declared that his revolution was to end people’s freedom in exchange for patriotism and a 
larger and stronger state, à la Europe and United Sates.89 Sun had a point. 
 
 
6. ‘Second Order’ Impact of China’s Ultra-low Tax Regime 
First of all, the Ming-Qing minimal and rent-restricting state undoubtedly contributed to ordinary 
Chinese material well-being and living standards on par with Western Europe by 1800, as what 
Kenneth Pomeranz argues. 90  China’s high living standards went hand in hand with (1) the 
unprecedented population growth and (2) the huge intake of foreign silver by China through 
exporting huge surplus produce by China’s private sector.91  
 
However, these benefits were easily cancelled out by a lack of internal law and order and external 
sovereignty/defence, due to the small state for the empire. Everything began to go wrong in the 
end of the eighteenth century. Domestically, it was the 1796-1805 ‘White Lotus Riot’ by the 
Buddhist Maitreya Sect, sweeping five provinces for nine years. This unrest foretold the 
simultaneous empire-wide unrests on a much larger scale 50 years later.92 Meanwhile, the illicit 
opium imports took roots on China’s long coast, which was out of Beijing’s control. In the 
following nineteenth century, the drug imports increased by a factor of 7 (Table 10). The only 





87 Sun, Three Populist Doctrines, p. 86. 
88 Ibid., p. 92. 
89 Burns and Hart, Fragment on Government; Dinwiddy, Bentham; Smith and Sosa, Mill’s Utilitarianism; Berger, Happiness, 
Justice, and Freedom; Griffin, Well-Being. 
90 Pomeranz, Great Divergence. 
91 Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 8; Frank, ReOrient. 
92 Zhao, Qing Dynasty, vol. 12, pp. 9808, 9889, 9932, 10048, 10053, 10142. Also see Institute of History of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences, White Lotus Uprising, vols 1-5.  
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Table 10. Opium Exports to China 
 Value in silver, ton Index    
1810s 1,097.1 100  
1830s 3,148.2 287 
1840s 5,026.8 458 
1850s 7,155.0 652  
1860s 8,347.5 761 
1870s 8,586.0 783 
1880s 8,109.0  739 
 
Sources: Hao, Commercial Revolution, p. 69; cf. Morse, East India Company, vols 3-5.  
 
This was however just the beginning of China’s international humiliation. After China’s defence 
weakness was ruthlessly exposed by the British, copy-cat wars against China followed (Table 11): 
 
Table 11. Wars against China 
Time  Name and cause 
1856-60  Second Opium War (also known as the ‘Arrow War’) over a dispute about a 
Hong Kong ship and treatment of a French missionary 
1883-5 Sino-French War (also known as Guerre Franco-chinoise) over the control of 
Vietnam 
1894 First Sino-Japanese War (also known as the ‘1894 War’) over the control of 
Korea 
1900 Invasion of the Eight-Nation Alliance after the Boxer Rioters’ attacks on 
Catholic priests and converts 
 
Sources: Forsyth, China Martyrs; Broomhall, Martyred Missionaries; Fairbank and Liu, History of China, vol. 11, pt 2, pp. 
115-30; Tang, Boxer Riot, vol. 4; Preston, Boxer Rebellion. 
 
Being a repeated loser in the wars, China signed 26 treaties with 12 foreign powers and granted 
the later 38 privileges (Table 12). From 1840 to 1900, China’s war reparations payable to foreign 
powers mounted to 713 million silver tales (26,600 tons),93 equivalent to 17 years of the Qing annual 









93 Zhang, Chinese Economic History, pp. 874-80; Tang, Customs Revenue, p. 33. 
94 Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 387, 397-98, 401, 415-16. 
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Table 12. ‘Unequal Treaties’ Signed by China, 1842-1901 
Date Treaty Beneficiary Main benefit 
1842-50 5 UK, USA, Fr Pt, Rp, Tr, PR, UMF, CJ, CCD 
   RD 
1851-60 5 UK, USA, Fr, Rs Pt, Rp, Tr, UMF, CJ, RD, CCD 
   RL, FA 
1861-70 2 UK, USA FT, RR 
1871-80  2 UK, USA Pt, UMF, CJ, FA, RL 
1881-90  3 Fr, Prl CCD, Pt, UMF, CJ, Tr, PR 
1891-1901  9 UK, USA, Fr, Atr, Sp Tr, Rp, Pt, CCD, RF, UMF 
  Blm, Fr, Gm, Hld, Itl RD, RR 
  Rs, Jp 
Total 26 12 38 
 
Source: Based on Zhang, Encyclopaedia, pp. 874-80. 
Notes: Atr – Austria, Blm – Belgium, Fr – France, Gm – Germany, Hld – Holland, Itl – Italy, Jp – Japan, Prl – 
Portugal, Rs – Russia, Sp – Spain. CCD – Cut in Customs Duty; CJ – Consular jurisdiction; FA – Free access to the 
interior; FT – Free trade of goods; PR – Permanent residency for foreigners; Pt – Free access to trading ports; RD – 
Right to deploy foreign armed forces; RF – Right to build factories; RL – Right to recruit Chinese labourers for 
overseas markets; Rp – War reparation; RR – Right to build railways; Tr – Territorial gain including cession and 
concession of land; UMF – Unilateral most-favoured-nation treatment for trade. 
 
 
7. Final remarks 
China’s unique ultra-low tax regime began after 134 BC during the Han Dynasty (206 BC-220 AD) 
and became a tradition. After the Mongol rule (1279-1368), it was re-established during the Ming 
(1368-1644) and entrenched under the Qing (1644-1911).  
 
The institutional arrangement which dictated the ultra-low tax regime came from Legalism and 
Confucianism, two competing ideologies historically. Chronologically, the former created 
aspirations for unification on East Asian Mainland to make peace; and the latter instrumentalised 
benevolence to keep peace after the birth of the empire. 
 
Despite the almighty appearance of the Imperial state, the state-peasant alliance and the Confucian 
benevolence jointly restricted rent-seeking by the state as shown in the Ming case. This distaste 
for rent-seeking was enhanced by the Manchu ruler for the sake of winning the heart and mind of 
the vast majority of society – the indigenous Han Chinese – after the Manchu mercenaries 
breached their contract with the Mings and stole the empire.  
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With all these intricacies, the ultra-low tax regime in China was a highly rational choice made by 
the state. History proves also that until the second half of the twentieth century it took many 
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